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Among the problems that any logical analysis of the notion of belief has to 
address, Moore’s Paradox occupies a preeminent position. G. E. Moore 
observed that sentences such as ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’ cannot be 
used to make coherent assertions, even though they are not actual contra-
dictions.1 There are situations in which the sentence will be true but none in 
which anybody could use it in a literal sense. In general, sentences of the 
form: 
 
(1) ‘p but I do not believe that p’  
 
are not self-contradictory, but there are no circumstances in which one can use 
them to perform coherent assertoric speech acts. The divergence between the 
truth conditions and the performance conditions of (1) leads to the paradoxical 
result that there are true sentences that one cannot utter.2 
 That a sentence of this type is not self-contradictory is illustrated by the 
fact that a simple change of person turns (1) into the perfectly natural sentence  
 
(2) ‘p but he does not believe that p’.  
 
Similarly, a change of tense also results in a coherent assertion:  
 
(3) ‘p but I did not believe it’.  
                                            
1. See G. E. Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Paul Arthur 
Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1942), pp. 541-543; and “Russell’s ‘Theory of 
Descriptions’,” in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul Arthur Shilpp (New York: Tudor 
Publishing Company, 1944), p. 204. 
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Finally, the absurdity of (1) also vanishes when the sentence is embedded in a 
larger context:  
 
(4) ‘Suppose that p but I do not believe that p’. 
  
 These characteristics of (1), which are not mirrored in the case of 
typical contradictions, seem to indicate that the problem is not a function of 
the truth conditions of the sentence, but rather of the performance conditions 
of the speech act that expresses it and, perhaps, of the mental analogue of 
these performance conditions for the corresponding propositional attitudes. 
For this reason, it has been argued that an adequate analysis of the notion of 
belief must be made in terms of statements, as opposed to sentences. Although 
an analysis in terms of sentences is all that is needed in most cases, there are 
certain properties of statements, such as the identity of the speaker and the 
recipient of his words, that cannot be defined solely in terms of the forms of 
words. On the other hand, an analysis in terms of sentences recommends itself 
due to the possibility of developing simplified logical systems which avoid the 
unmanageable task of defining complex performance conditions. 
 In Knowledge and Belief, 3 Hintikka tried to achieved the synthesis of 
both approaches. In that seminal work, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic 
for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of 
knowledge and belief. Most of his analysis is made in terms of sentences, 
including his explanation of Moore’s Paradox, but he describes the way in 
                                                                                                                                     
2. As some authors have noted, Moore’s Paradox can be extended to other propositional attitudes. 
For example, the statement ‘Rain is likely, but I do not expect it’ is also absurd. In this essay I will 
only be concerned with the notion of belief. 
3. Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1962). 
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which the system can be expanded to handle sentences whose meaning varies 
according to the context of utterance and the identity of the speaker.  
 A conspicuous feature of Hintikka’s analysis is that the logic of belief 
turns out to be parasitic on the logic of knowledge in the sense that the former 
is simply a weaker version of the latter. Although one would expect to find 
more than one similarity between both logics, the fact that the logic of belief is 
so closely modeled after the system developed for the notion of knowledge 
leads Hintikka to adopt a set of axioms that—I will argue—is unnecessarily 
strong and highly problematic. In this essay I will develop an alternative  
logical system for sentences containing the notion of belief. The system, 
which I will call H*, retains the basic elements of Hintikka’s system but it is 
based on a weaker set of axioms. I will try to show that the axioms of H* 
capture in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief 
without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic 
cases such as Moore’s Paradox. 
 
1. The System H* 
Hintikka’s analysis of the notion of belief is based on the two multimodal 
operators Ba and Ca, which are the formal counterparts of ‘a believes that’ and 
‘it is compatible with everything that a believes that’. Each subscript a, b, c, ... 
represents a different individual. Hintikka explains the intuitive idea behind 
the operator Ca in terms of consistency. If my beliefs are consistent, it must be 
possible for all of them to turn out to be true without having to give up any of 
them. Similarly, if something is compatible with my consistent beliefs, then it 
must be possible for this something to turn out to be the case together with 
everything I believe without making it necessary for me to give up any of my 
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beliefs.4 In formal terms, if the set {Baq1, Baq2, ..., Baqk, Cap} is consistent, 
then the set {Baq1, Baq2, ..., Baqk, q1, q2, ..., qk, p} must also be consistent. 
 This interpretation, however, is problematic. Clearly my beliefs are 
consistent if there is a possible state of affairs in which they are all true, but it 
is not obvious why it should be added that in that state of affairs I must 
possess those beliefs. If my beliefs are consistent, it is compatible with 
everything I believe that there is a state of affairs in which my beliefs are true 
even though I may not possess some of them. But Hintikka’s interpretation of 
Ca excludes that possibility because the set {Bap, Ca~Bap} turns out to be 
inconsistent.5 On the other hand, if my beliefs are consistent, it is also 
compatible with everything I believe that there is a state of affairs in which my 
beliefs are true and I possess those beliefs. This is the only possibility that 
Hintikka allows. 
 Since there is no obvious reason to exclude the first possibility, my 
interpretation of Ca will be as follows: If the set {Baq1, Baq2, ..., Baqk, Cap} is 
consistent, then the set {q1, q2, ..., qk, p} must also be consistent. Thus 
according to this interpretation, the set {Bap, Ca~Bap} will not be inconsistent. 
One of the challenges in developing the system H* will be to formulate a set 
of axioms that capture these intuitions about the notion of belief. 
 The basis of H* is as follows. 
 
Primitive Symbols 
 p1, p2, p3, ..., pk     [Propositional variables] 
 ~, Ba, Bb, ..., Bn, Ca Cb, ..., Cn   [Monadic operators] 
&, ∨, ⊃, ≡     [Dyadic operators]  
                                            
4. Ibid., p. 24. 
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Formation Rules 
 
FR1  A variable standing alone is a wff. 
FR2 If p is a wff, so is ~p. 
FR3 If p and q are wffs, and • is a dyadic operator, then (p • q) is a wff. 
FR4 If p is a wff, then Bap and Cap are wffs. 
 
Definitions: 
[Def B] Bap ≡Def ~Ca~p 
[Def C] Cap ≡Def ~Ba~p 
 
Axioms 
The theorems include all tautologies of the propositional calculus, plus the 
following axioms: 
A1 Ba(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Bap ⊃ Baq) 
A2 Bap ⊃ Cap 
A3  Bap ⊃ CaBap 
 
Transformation Rule 
Modus Ponens (MP)   
   p    p ⊃ q  
      q  
 
 Using possible world semantics, we can provide an intuitively 
meaningful interpretation of the system. A model set is a partial description of 
a possible world. A set µ of sentences is a model set iff it satisfies the 
following conditions: 
(C.~) If p ∈ µ , then ~p ∉ µ. 
                                                                                                                                     
5. The reason is obvious. Suppose the set {Bap, Ca~Bap}is consistent. Then, according to Hintikka’s 
interpretation of Ca, the set {p, Bap, ~Bap} is consistent, which is absurd. 
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(C.&)   If p & q ∈ µ, then p ∈ µ and q ∈ µ. 
(C. ∨)   If p ∨ q ∈ µ, then p ∈ µ or q ∈ µ (or both). 
(C.~ ~)  If ~~p ∈ µ , then p ∈ µ. 
(C.~&)  If ~(p & q) ∈ µ, then ~p ∈ µ or ~q ∈ µ (or both). 
(C. ~∨)  If ~(p ∨ q) ∈ µ, then ~p ∈ µ and ~q ∈ µ. 
 In order to provide a semantical interpretation of the multimodal 
operators Ba and Ca, we need to make reference to more that one model set. 
The reason is obvious. If p is compatible with my beliefs, then there must be 
at least one state of affairs in which p turns out to be the case. But this state of 
affairs need not be identical with the one in which I believe that p. We will 
call a description of such state of affairs an alternative to µ with respect to a.  
 Let Ω be a set of model sets µ, µ∗, µ∗∗, ... Such set of model sets 
will be called a model system. The following conditions must be imposed on a 
model set µ.  
 
(C.B) If Bap ∈ µ and if µ belongs to a model system Ω, then there is in Ω 
at least one alternative µ∗ to µ such that p ∈ µ∗. 
(C.B*)  If Bap ∈ µ  and if µ* is an alternative to µ in some model system Ω, 
 then p ∈ µ∗. 
(C.C) If Cap ∈ µ and if µ belongs to a model system Ω, then there is in Ω 
 at least one alternative µ∗ to µ such that p ∈ µ∗. 
(C. CB) If Bap ∈ µ and if µ belongs to a model system Ω, then there is in Ω 
at least one alternative µ∗ to µ such that Bap ∈ µ∗. 
(C.BDef) Bap ∈ µ if and only if ~Ca~p ∈ µ 
(C.CDef)  Cap ∈ µ if and only if ~Ba~p ∈ µ. 
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 There are several important differences between our system H* and the 
system proposed by Hintikka. Instead of axiom A3, Hintikka includes the 
following axiom in his system: 
 
(5)  Bap ⊃ BaBap. 
 
In defense of (5), he argues6 that the axiom is necessary to prove that the 
following sentence is a contradiction: 
 
(6) Bap & (Bap ⊃ Ba~Bap). 
 
Although (6) is certainly contradictory, it is also true that our system, whose 
set of axioms is weaker than the set of axioms in Hintikka’s system, suffices 
to show that it is. Consider the following reductio of (6) in our system: 
 
(6) Bap & (Bap ⊃ Ba~Bap) ∈  µ  Counterassumption 
(7) Bap ⊃ Ba~Bap  ∈  µ  From (6) by (C.&) 
(8) Bap  ∈  µ    From (6) by (C.&) 
(9) Ba~Bap  ∈  µ   From (7) and (8) by Modus Ponens 
(10) Bap  ∈  µ∗    From (8) by (C.CB) 
(11) ~Bap  ∈  µ∗    From (9) by (C.B*) 
(10) and (11) violate (C.~), thus reducing the counterassumption  ad 
absurdum. The proof in H* shows that Hintikka’s argument alone does not 
justify the inclusion of axiom (5) in a logic of belief. In the next section I will 
argue that there are independent reasons to reject (5) and to adopt the weaker 
set of axioms.  
                                            
6. Ibid., p. 25.  
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 The conditions that Hintikka imposes on model sets also differ from the 
ones in our system. Instead of our condition (C.CB), Hintikka includes the 
following condition in his system:  
 
 (C.BB*) If Bap ∈ µ  and if µ* is an alternative to µ in some model system Ω, 
 then Bap ∈ µ∗. 
 
Notice the difference between (C.BB*) and (C.CB). The former says that if I 
believe something in µ, I believe it in every alternative to µ. The latter says 
that if I believe something in µ, there is at least one alternative to µ in which I 
believe it. (C.BB*) entails (C.CB), but not the converse. Intuitively, if I 
believe that p in µ, (C.CB) does not rule out the possibility of there being 
alternatives to µ in which I do not believe that p. This is not a problem, for all 
that is needed for my beliefs to be consistent is that there be at least one 
alternative model set in which they are true. If I believe that p, (C.B) alone 
guarantees that there is at least one alternative model set in which p is true. 
(C.CB) is added to reflect our intuition that there are some model sets in 
which p is true and I believe it, and others in which p is true and I do not 
believe it. 
 The difference between (C.CB) and (C.BB*), of course, simply reflects 
our choice of axiom A3 instead of Hintikka’s axiom (5). In our system, the 
sentence 
 
(12) Bap ⊃ Ca~Bap 
 
is not a contradiction. If Bap ∈ µ, there may be an alternative µ* to µ such that 
~Bap ∈ µ*. Hence, Bap ⊃ BaBap —Hintikka’s axiom (5)—will be false in 
some model sets. On the other hand, according to our condition (C.CB), if Bap 
∈ µ, then there is at least one alternative µ* to µ such that Bap ∈ µ*. 
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Therefore, our third axiom, Bap ⊃ CaBap, is true in every model set of our 
system. In the remaining sections of the essay I will provide further reasons to 
support the claim that Hintikka’s axiom (5) should not be a theorem in a logic 
of belief and that it should be replaced by axiom A3. 
 
2. Believing That One Believes 
Prima facie, Hintikka’s axiom (5) seems extremely plausible. If I believe that 
p, it seems absurd to deny that I believe that I believe that p. But the 
obviousness of (5) disappears when the sentence is not in the first-person. It is 
not absurd to assert of someone else that he believes that p but he does not 
believe that he believes that p. Consider the truth conditions for the sentence 
Bap. The sentence is true iff a is in an intentional state whose content is p and 
whose propositional attitude is belief. ~Bap, on the other hand, is true iff a is 
not in that intentional state. Now consider the truth conditions for the sentence 
BaBap. The sentence is true iff a is in an intentional state whose content is Bap 
and whose mental attitude is belief. In other words, BaBap is true iff a’s belief 
that p is accompanied by a concurrent belief whose content is Bap. The 
negation of BaBap, on the other hand, is true iff a is not in the intentional state 
of believing that Bap. 
 It is perfectly possible that when someone believes that p, no concurrent 
belief occurs about that person’s belief that p. For example, the sentence 
 
(13) ‘Mary believes that it is raining but she does not believe that she 
believes that it is raining’ 
 
is not absurd or self-contradictory. A virtue of our system is that it captures 
this important fact about the notion of belief. The sentence 
 
(13*) Bap & ~BaBap 
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is not a contradiction in H*. But notice that (13*) is simply the negation of 
Hintikka’s axiom (5). If we accept (5) as an axiom, we would also have to 
claim that (13) and (13*) are contradictions (which is clearly not the case). 
Therefore, unless we want to misrepresent an important aspect of the analysis 
of the notion of belief, (5) cannot be an axiom of the system.  
 What, then, about the absurdity of uttering sentence (13*) when a is the 
speaker? One option is to modify our system and include an ad hoc clause 
about the performance conditions of sentences in the first person. But there is 
no need to do so. Notice that (13*) is just a version of Moore’s Paradox and 
can be treated as such. In order to examine the oddity of (13*), we must now 
turn to the analysis of Moore’s Paradox. 
 
3. Explaining the Paradoxes 
Before considering the problem described above, I will return to the original 
paradox in order to show that Hintikka’s proposed solution is also valid in our 
weaker system. We can symbolize Moore’s Paradox in the following terms: 
 
(1*) p & ~Bap. 
 
The sentence is not a contradiction because 
 
(14)  p  ⊃ Bap 
 
is not a theorem in either system. Hintikka’s ingenious solution to the paradox 
is to argue that although (1*) is not a contradiction, the following sentence is: 
 
(15) Ba( p & ~Bap). 
 
This sentence corresponds to the general presumption that the speaker believes 
or at least can conceivably believe what he or she says. In Hintikka’s words, 
“the gist of Moore’s Paradox may be said (somewhat elliptically) to lie in the 
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fact that [(15)] is necessarily unbelievable by the speaker.”7 A virtue of this 
approach is that nothing turns on the peculiarities of the first-person singular 
pronoun. (15) is contradictory no matter who a is. 
 Instead of presenting Hintikka’s proof that (15) is a contradiction, I will 
present a similar proof in H*, and indicate the pertinent differences. The proof 
is a reductio of the following counterassumption: 
 
(16) Ba(p & ~Bap) ∈ µ  Counterassumption 
(17) p & ~Bap ∈ µ*  From (16) by (C.B*)  
(18) Ba( p & ~Bap) ∈ µ* From (16) by (C.CB) 
(19) ~Bap ∈ µ*   From (17) by (C.&) 
(20) Ca~p ∈ µ*   From (19) by (C. BDef) 
(21) ~p ∈ µ**   From (20) by (C.C) 
(22) p & ~Bap ∈ µ**  From (18) by (C.B*) 
(23) p ∈ µ**   From (22) by (C.&) 
 
Here (21) and (23) contradict (C.~), thus completing the reductive argument. 
The main difference between our argument and Hintikka’s is the justification 
of (18). Instead of (C.CB), which is not a condition in Hintikka’s system, he 
uses (C.BB*). This difference is unimportant because, as Hintikka admits at 
one point, the proof could be done without making use of that condition. 
 We can now return to the version of Moore’s Paradox presented in the 
previous section. Following Hintikka’s strategy, we can prove that although 
(13*) is not a contradiction in H*, the following sentence is: 
 
(24) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap). 
 
The proof is a reductio of the following counterassumption: 
                                            
7. Ibid., p. 67. 
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(25) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap) ∈ µ  Counterassumption 
(26) Bap & ~BaBap ∈ µ*  From (25) by (C.B*)  
(27) Ba(Bap & ~BaBap) ∈ µ*  From (25) by (C.CB)  
(28) ~BaBap ∈ µ*   From (26) by (C.&) 
(29) Ca~Bap ∈ µ*   From (28) by (C.BDef) 
(30) ~Bap ∈ µ**    From (29) by (C. C) 
(31) Bap & ~BaBap ∈ µ**  From (27) by (C.B*) 
(32) Bap ∈ µ**    From (31) by (C.&) 
 
(30) and (32) contradict (C.~), thus completing the reductive argument. Just as 
in the original version of the paradox, (24) is a contradiction regardless of the 
identity of a.  
 This analysis of (13*) explains the problematic case in which the 
sentence is in the first-person, and gives further plausibility to my choice of 
axiom A3. In fairness to Hintikka, I must admit that the advantages of my 
system over the one he developed in Knowledge and Belief depend entirely on 
my reinterpretation of the modal operator Ca. I believe, however, that this 
reinterpretation, and the system that can be constructed on it, give us a better 
picture of the logical structure of sentences containing the notion of belief.  
 
